In all social and economic interactions, individuals or coalitions choose not only with whom to interact but how to interact, and over time both the structure (the "with whom") and the strategy ("the how") of interactions change. Our objectives here are to model the structure and strategy of interactions prevailing at any point in time as a directed network and to address the following open question in the theory of social and economic network formation: given the rules of network and coalition formation, the preferences of individuals over networks, the strategic behavior of coalitions in forming networks, and the trembles of nature, what network and coalitional dynamics are likely to emergence and persist. Our main contributions are (i) to formulate the problem of network and coalition formation as a dynamic, stochastic game, (ii) to show that this game possesses a stationary correlated equilibrium (in network and coalition formation strategies), (iii) to show that, together with the trembles of nature, this stationary correlated equilibrium determines an equilibrium Markov process of network and coalition formation, and (iv) to show that this endogenous process possesses a finite, nonempty set of ergodic measures, and generates a finite, disjoint collection of nonempty subsets of networks and coalitions, each constituting a basin of attraction. We also extend to the setting of endogenous Markov dynamics the notions of pairwise stability (Jackson-Wolinsky, 1996), strong stability (Jacksonvan den Nouweland, 2005), and Nash stability (Bala-Goyal, 2000), and we show that in order for any network-coalition pair to persist and be stable (pairwise, strong, or Nash) it is necessary and sufficient that the pair reside in one of finitely many basins of attraction. The results we obtain here for endogenous network dynamics and stochastic basins of attraction are the dynamic analogs of our earlier results on endogenous network formation and strategic basins of attraction in static, abstract games of network formation (Page and Wooders, In all social and economic interactions, individuals or coalitions choose not only with whom to interact but how to interact, and over time both the structure (the "with whom") and the strategy ("the how") of interactions change. Our objectives here are to model the structure and strategy of interactions prevailing at any point in time as a directed network and to address the following open question in the theory of social and economic network formation: given the rules of network formation, the preferences of individuals over networks, the strategic behavior of coalitions in forming networks, and the trembles of nature, what network and coalitional dynamics are likely to emergence and persist. Thus, we propose to study the emergence of endogenous network and coalitional dynamics from strategic behavior and the randomness in nature.
1 Introduction far as we know, the first models of network dynamics (see also Skyrms and Pemantle (2000) ). By considering a sequence of perturbed irreducible and aperiodic Markov chains (i.e., each with a unique invariant measure) converging to the original Markov chain, they show that any pairwise stable network is necessarily contained in the support of an invariant measure -that is, in the support of a probability measure that places all its support on sets of networks likely to form in the long run. We show here that similar conclusions can be reached for directed networks with many arc types governed by arbitrary network formation rules.
In a general Markov game setting, with farsighted players, what precisely does it mean for a network to be pairwise stable -or stable in any sense? For example, if the state space of networks is large, then the endogenous Markov process of network formation is likely to have many invariant measures -and in fact many ergodic probability measures (i.e., measures that place all their probability mass on a single absorbing set). Which absorbing set contains networks stable in the sense of pairwise stability, or strong stability, or Nash stability? These are some of the questions we answer here in our study of endogenous network dynamics.
We conjecture that in any reasonable dynamic, stochastic model of network formation the endogenously determined Markov process of network and coalition formation will possess ergodic probability measures and generate basins of attraction. We show here that in fact the endogenous Markov process possesses only finitely many ergodic measures and basins of attraction. This endogenous finiteness property of equilibrium has serious implications for empirical work on networks. In particular, since nature does not afford the empirical observer multiple observations across states but rather only multiple observations across time, the fact that only finitely many long run equilibrium sets are possible and more importantly, the fact that on these sets (i.e., on these basins of attraction) state averages are equal to time averages gives meaning and significance to time series observations which seek to infer the long run equilibrium network. Moreover, to the extent that networks can truly represent various social and economic interactions, our understanding of how and why the network formation process moves toward or away from any particular basin can potentially shed new light on the persistence or transience of many social and economic conditions. For example, how and why does a particular path of entrepreneurial and scientific interactions carry an economy beyond a tipping point and onto a path of economic growth driven by a particular industry -and why might it fail to do so? How and why does a particular path of product line-nonlinear pricing schedule configurations lead a strategically competitive industry to become more concentratedor fade? These are some of the applied questions which hopefully can be addressed using a model of endogenous network dynamics
Endogenous Network Dynamics
Our approach to endogenous dynamics is motivated by the observation that the stochastic process governing network and coalition formation through time is determined not only by nature's randomness (or nature's trembles) through time -as envisioned in random graph theoretic approaches -but also by the strategic behavior of individu-als and coalitions through time in attempting to influence the networks and coalitions that emerge under the prevailing rules of network formation and the trembles of nature. Thus, here we will develop a theory of endogenous network and coalitional dynamics that brings together elements of random graph theory and game theory in a dynamic stochastic game model of network and coalition formation. While dynamic stochastic games have been used elsewhere in economics (see, for example, Amir (1991 Amir ( , 1996 , Amir and Lambson (2003) , and Chakrabarti (1999 Chakrabarti ( , 2008 , Duffie, Geanakoplos, Mas-Colell, and McLennan (1994) , Parthasarathy (1987, 1991) , Nowak (2003 Nowak ( , 2007 ), their application to the analysis of the evolution of social and economic networks is relatively new.
Our plan of analysis has two parts. In part (1) we will construct our dynamic game model of network and coalition formation, and then show that this game has an equilibrium in stationary correlated stationary strategies. Our model has six primitives consisting of the following: (i) a feasible set of directed networks representing all possible configurations of social or economic interactions, (ii) a feasible set of coalitions allowed to form under the rules of network formation for the purpose of proposing alternative networks, (iii) a state space consisting of feasible network-coalition pairs, (iv) a set of players and player constraint correspondences specifying for each player and in each state the set of feasible alternative networks and coalitions that a player can propose under the rules of network formation as a member of the current or status quo coalition -and as a nonmember, (v) a set of player discount rates and payoff functions defined on the graph of players' product constraint correspondence, and (vi) a stochastic law of motion. This stochastic law of motion represents nature and specifies the probability with which each possible new status quo network-coalition (i.e., new state) might emerge as a function of the status quo network-coalition pair (i.e., the current state) and the profile of player-proposed new status quo network-coalition pairs (i.e., the current action profile). Using these primitives, we will construct a discounted stochastic game model of network formation, and then show that this game possesses a stationary correlated equilibrium in network-coalition proposal strategies.
Finally, in part (1) we will show that, together with the stochastic law of motion, these stationary correlated equilibrium strategies determine an equilibrium Markov process of network and coalition formation. More importantly, we will be able to conclude via classical results due to Blackwell (1965) (also, Himmelberg, Parthasarathy, and vanVleck (1976)), Nowak and Raghavan (1992) , and Duffie, Geanakoplos, Mas-Colell, and McLennan (1994)) that these stationary correlated equilibrium strategies are optimal against player defections to any other history-dependent network-coalition proposal strategies -thus showing that our decision to focus on stationary correlated strategies is well-founded.
In part (2), we will analyze the stability properties the endogenous Markov process of network and coalition formation. In particular, using methods of stability analysis essentially due to Nummelin (1984) and Meyn and Tweedie (1993) -and based on the profound work of Doeblin (1937 Doeblin ( , 1940 ) -we will show that the equilibrium Markov process of network and coalition formation possesses ergodic probability measures and generates basins of attraction. We will then study in some detail the number and structure of these basins of attraction as well as the structure of set of invariant probability measures. More importantly, we will show that the equilibrium process possesses only finitely many ergodic measures and basins of attraction. Finally, in part (2), we will extend the definitions of pairwise stable, strongly stable, Nash, and consistent networks to the dynamic Markov setting of the model and show that these various types of stable networks can persist only in the basins of attraction generated under the appropriate specification of the rules of network formation and feasible coalitions.
Related Literature
To our knowledge, the first paper to study endogenous dynamics in a related model is the paper by Konishi and Ray (2003) on dynamic coalition formation. The primitives of their model consist of (i) a finite set of outcomes (possibly a finite set of networks), (ii) a set of coalitional constraint correspondences specifying for each coalition and each status quo outcome, the set of new outcomes a coalition might bring about if allowed to do so, and (iii) a discount rate and set of player payoff functions defined on the set of all outcomes. Konishi and Ray show that their model possesses an equilibrium process of coalition formation, that is, a stochastic law of motion governing movement from one outcome to another such that (a) if a move from one outcome to another takes place with positive probability, then for some coalition this move makes sense in that no coalition member is made worse off by the move and no further move makes all coalition members better off, and (b) if for a given outcome there is another outcome making all members of some coalition better off and no further outcome makes this coalition even better off, then a move to another outcome takes place with probability 1 (i.e., the probability of standing still at the given outcome is zero). The notion of a player being better off is reckoned in terms of a player's valuation function implied by the maximization of the expected discounted stream of payoffs with respect to the stochastic law of motion. Stated loosely, then, Konishi and Ray show that for their model there is a law of motion which generates coalitionally Pareto improving moves from one outcome to another (i.e., in our case it would be from one network to another).
Our model differs from the model of Konishi and Ray in several respects. First, in our model movements from one network (outcome) to another are largely determined by the strategic behavior of individuals within feasible coalitions. In Konishi and Ray, coalitions are passive and strategic behavior plays no part in determining the movement from one outcome to another. They simply show that there model is consistent with there being a law of motion which moves the outcome along in a coalitionally Pareto improving way. In this sense -i.e., in the sense that movement is nonstrategic -their model is more closely related to random graph theoretic models of network dynamics. In our model, equilibrium strategic behavior, together with natures trembles, are central to determining equilibrium network dynamics.
Second, whereas Konishi and Ray, for technical reasons, restrict attention to a finite set of outcomes (in our model, a finite set of networks), we allow for uncountably many networks -this to allow for consideration of networks with a large number of nodes or networks with uncountably many arc types. This generalization is more than a technical nicety. In order to capture the myriad and potentially complex nature of interactions between players (say for example in a stock market or in a contracting game with multiple principals and multiple agents) we must allow there to be uncountably many possible types of interactions. In our model the set of potential interactions are represented by a set of arc types with each arc type (or arc label) representing a particular type of interaction (or connection) between nodes in a directed network. Thus, because we allow for uncountably many arc types in describing the possibly finite number of interactions between nodes, in our model there are uncountably many possible networks (or outcomes in the language of Konishi and Ray). Moreover, in order to model large networks (i.e., networks with many nodes), in our model we can allow there to be infinitely many nodes -although here we focus exclusively on the finite nodes case. Third, while Konishi and Ray restrict attention at the outset to Markov laws of motion, we will show that our strategically determined equilibrium Markov process of network and coalition formation is robust against all possible alternative dynamics induced by history-dependent types of strategic behavior. Thus, at least for the class of Konishi-Ray types of models, we will show that Markov laws of motion are stable and robust with respect to other forms of history-dependent laws of motion. 1 Finally, whereas Konishi and Ray focus on the existence of an equilibrium process of coalition formation, here we will not only establish the existence of a strategically determined equilibrium process of network and coalition formation, but also we will show that this process possesses a nonempty set of ergodic measures and generates basins of attraction.
Dutta, Ghosal, and Ray (2005) extend the Konishi-Ray type model to consider a particular form of strategic behavior (i.e., strategic behavior governed by a particular set of network formation rules) in a dynamic game of network formation over a finite set of undirected linking networks (rather than directed networks). They show that their model has a Nash equilibrium and identify conditions under which efficiency can be sustained in equilibrium -thus, continuing in a dynamic setting the seminal work of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) on equilibrium and efficiency. Here our focus is on equilibrium and stability rather than equilibrium and efficiency and our analysis is carried out in a dynamic, stochastic game model of network and coalition formation, admitting all forms of network formation rules, over an uncountable set of directed networks. While Dutta, Ghosal, and Ray restrict attention to Markov strategies and show that there is an equilibrium in this class of network formation strategies, here, we show that there is an equilibrium in the class of all stationary correlated network and coalition proposal strategies and that this type of equilibrium is optimal relative to the class of all history-dependent network formation strategies. Moreover, as mentioned above, we show that in general, the resulting equilibrium Markov network and coalitional dynamics possess ergodic measures and generate network and coalitional basin of attraction.
We view the starting point of our research to be the pioneering work of Jackson and Watts (2002) already discussed briefly above. Our model of endogenous network and coalitional dynamics extends their work on stochastic network dynamics in several respects. First, in our model players behave farsightedly in attempting to influence the path of network and coalition formation -farsighted in the sense of dynamic programing (e.g., Dutta, Ghosal, and Ray (2005)) 2 . Moreover, in our model the game is played over a (possibly) uncountable collection of directed networks under general rules of network formation which include not only the Jackson-Wolinsky rules, but also other more complex rules. In our model the law of motion is such that the trembles of nature are Markovian rather than i.i.d. as in Jackson and Watt, and are functions of the current state and the current profile of network and coalition proposals by players. Extending the notion of pairwise stability to a dynamic setting, one of the benchmarks for our research is to show that in a Markov model of network and coalition formation, if a network is dynamically pairwise stable, then in order to persist, it must be contained in one of finitely many basins of attraction, and therefore, contained in the support of an ergodic probability measure.
Primitives

The Space of Directed Networks
We begin by giving the formal definition of a directed network. Let N be a finite set of nodes with typical element denoted by i and let A be a compact metric space of arcs with typical element denoted by a. Denote by d A the metric on A and by d N the discrete metric on N . 3 Arcs represent potential connections between nodes, and depending on the application, nodes can represent economic agents or economic objects such as markets or firms.
Definition 1 (Directed Networks)
Given node set N and arc set A, a directed network, G, is a nonempty, closed subset of A × (N × N ). The collection of all directed networks is denoted by
) thus consists of a closed set of ordered pairs of the form (a, (i, i )) where a is an arc type or an arc label and (i, i ) is an ordered pair of nodes. We shall refer to any pair (a, (i, i )) ∈ G as a connection in network G. Thus, a network G is a closed set of connections specifying how the nodes in N are connected by the arcs in A. In a directed network order matters. In particular, (a, (i, i )) ∈ G means that nodes i and i are connected by a type a arc from node i to node i .
Note that under our definition of a directed network, loops are allowed -that is, we allow an arc to go from a given node back to that given node. 4 Finally, note that under our definition an arc can be used multiple times in a given network and multiple arcs can go from one node to another. However, our definition does not allow an arc a to go from a node i to a node i multiple times.
The following notation is useful in describing networks. Given directed network
Thus, in network G, 3 The discrete metric d N is given by
G(a) is the set of node pairs connected by arc a, G + (i) is the set of arcs leaving node i, and G − (i ) is the set of arcs entering node i .
If for some arc a ∈ A, G(a) is empty, then arc a is not used in network G. Also, if for some node i ∈ N , G + (i) ∪ G − (i) is empty, then node i is said to be isolated.
Because A×(N ×N ) is a compact metric space, the set of networks P f (A×(N ×N )) equipped with the Hausdorff metric h is a compact metric space (see Aliprantis and Border (1999) , sections 3.14-3.16). Formally, the Hausdorff metric is defined as follows: First, let the distance between connection (a,
is the metric on A × (N × N ). Given this distance measure between connections and networks, the Hausdorff metric h is then defined as 5 Given the nature of the discrete metric on the set of nodes, it is easy to see that if the Hausdorff distance between networks G and G is less than ε ∈ (0, 1), that is, if networks G and G are within ε distance for ε < 1, then the same set of nodes are involved in connections in both networks and the networks differ only in the way these nodes are connected (i.e., in the types of arcs used in making the connections).
for arcs a and a with d A (a, a ) < ε.
Convergence in the space of directed networks (P f (A×(N ×N )), h) can be characterized via the notions of limit inferior and limit superior. Let {G n } n be a sequence of directed networks. The limit inferior of this sequence, denoted by Li(G n ), is defined as follows: connection (a, (i, i )) ∈ Li(G n ) if and only if there is a sequence of connections {(a n , (i n , i n ))} n converging to (a, (i, i )) (i.e., (a n , (i n , i n )) d → (a, (i, i ))) where for each n connection (a n , (i n , i n )) is contained in network G n . The limit superior, denoted by Ls(G n ), is defined as follows: connection (a, (i, i )) ∈ Ls(G n ) if and only if there is a subsequence of connections {(a n k , (i n k , i n k ))} k converging to (a, (i, i )) 5 It is important to note that because A × (N × N) is compact, all metrics compatible with the product topology on A × (N × N), generate the same Hausdorff metric topology on P f (A × (N × N)) (see Theorem 3.77 in Aliprantis and Border (1999) ).
(i.e., (a n k , (i n k , i n k )) d → (a, (i, i ))) where for each k connection (a n k , (i n k , i n k )) is con-
under the Hausdorff metric h -see Theorem 3.93 in Aliprantis and Border (1999) ). 6 In formulating our game of network and coalition formation, it will often be useful to restrict attention to a particular feasible subset of networks.
Definition 2 (Feasible Networks)
Given node set N and arc set A, a feasible set of networks is a nonempty, h-closed subset G of the collection of all directed networks P f (A × (N × N )).
Example (A feasible set of networks): Suppose that the feasible set of networks G is given by
where c(·) is a nonnegative integer-valued function and |G + (i)| denotes the cardinality of the set of arcs G + (i) emanating from node i (i.e., the out degree of node i). Thus, in each network G contained in G there is at most c(i) arcs emanating from node i. It is easy to show that G is an h-closed subset of P f (A × (N × N )).
Players and Coalitions
We will make a distinction between the set of players (or decision makers) and the set of nodes. In particular, we will not assume that the set of players and the set of nodes are necessarily one and the same. For example, some nodes may be club locations while other nodes may be players who choose clubs. Because changing one network to another network very often involves groups of players acting in concert, coalitions will play a central role in our model. Let D denote the set of players (a set not necessarily equal to N the set of nodes) with typical element denoted by d and let P (D) denote the collection of all coalitions (i.e., nonempty subsets of D) with typical element denoted by S. We will assume that the set of players D has cardinality m (i.e., |D| = m). Depending on the rules of network formation, it will often be useful to restrict attention to a particular feasible subset of coalitions.
Definition 3 (Feasible Coalitions)
Given player set D, a feasible set of coalitions is a nonempty subset F of the collection of all coalitions P (D).
Examples (Feasible sets of coalitions):
(1) Suppose that the feasible set of coalitions is given
Thus, all feasible coalitions consist of at most two players. The set F 2 is, for example, the feasible set for the Jackson-Wolinsky rules. If the set of nodes and the set of players are one in the same, then under the Jackson-Wolinsky rules, a connection can be removed from a network if and only if one or both players involved in the connection agree to remove the connection (arc subtraction is unilateral), and a connection can be added to a network if and only if both players involved in the connection agree to add the connection (arc addition is bilateral).
(2) Suppose that the feasible set of coalitions is given
Thus, all feasible coalitions consist of one player. The set F 1 is, for example, the feasible set for the noncooperative, Bala-Goyal rules (Bala-Goyal (2000)). If the set of nodes and the set of players are one in the same, then under the Bala-Goyal rules, a connection can be added or removed from a network if and only if the initiating player in the connection agrees to add or remove the connection (arc addition and subtraction is unilateral). 7
States, Actions, and Payoffs
We shall take as the state space the set Ω := (G×F) of all feasible network-coalition pairs. Each state in (G×F) has the following interpretation: if (G, S) is the current state, then G is the current status quo network of social interactions and it is coalition S's turn to propose a new state -that is, to propose a new status quo network and a new coalition to propose the next network.
Letting B(Ω) := B(G × F) be the Borel σ-field generated by the metric d Ω , we equip our state space (G×F, B(G × F)) with a probability measure μ = ν × γ 7 Let (a, (i, i )) be a connection in network G where the set of nodes is equal to the set of players. In the connection (a, (i, i )), player i is the initiating player.
where the probability measure γ on coalitions is such that γ(S) > 0 for all S ∈ F and where the probability measure ν on networks is such that the countable set of networks constituting the set of all atoms of the dominating probability measure ν is given by
For all G αk ∈ A ν , ν({G αk }) > 0 and for all networks G ∈ G\A ν , ν({G}) = 0 (Parthasarathy (1967)). Thus, we have as our state space, the probability space
a compact metric space with metric
is the set of all subsets of F (including the empty set). In our game each player's action takes the form of a recommendation or proposal. In particular, given current state (G, S) ∈ Ω, each player d ∈ D has available a nonempty, d Ω -closed set of actions Φ d (G, S) ⊆ G×F -that is, a closed set of proposals. We will assume that
Thus, for each player d the mapping Φ d (·) specifies, for any current state (G, S), the set of network-coalition proposals available to player d, and thus the collection of constraint mappings
specifies the rules of network formation by specifying for each player d, in each state of the game (G, S), the possible moves that player d can make. With this in mind, we will assume that A-1 (continuity of the constraint mappings)
and (ii) Φ d (·) has a closed graph,
Thus, under A-1(i)(a) each player d in each state (G, S) has the option of proposing that the status quo network-coalition pair be maintained, and under A-1(i)(b) if the player is not part of the coalition whose turn it is to move, then the status quo is the only network proposal available to that player. Notice however (see A-1(i)(b)), that even if a player is not part of the coalition whose turn it is to move, then that player can propose that another coalition, other than the status quo coalition S, be chosen to propose the next network.
Assumption A-1(ii) implies that the correspondence
has a closed graph.
In order for players to decide which states to propose, we must specify the payoff functions. We shall assume that A-2 (measurability and continuity of payoffs) each player d ∈ D has a payoff function
such that
Thus, if the current state is (G, S) (i.e., if the status quo network is G and it is coalition S's turn to move) and if players propose m-tuple of networks-coalition pairs
then player d s payoff is given by
The Law of Motion
Given the profile of player proposals (G D , S D ) and given the current state, (G, S) ∈ (G×F), nature then chooses the next state (i.e., the next network-coalition pair) according to probabilistic transition law, q(·|(G, S), (G D , S D )) defined on the state space (G×F, B(G × F)). We will assume the following concerning the law of motion:
A-3 (measurability, continuity, and domination of the law of motion)
is measurable over the graph of Φ(·);
is absolutely continuous with respect the probability measure
Remarks 1:
In order to save writing and spare the reader, when no confusion is possible, we will use the notation
for our state space and the notation ω for elements (G, S) of the state space.
It should be noted that (A.3)(ii) is stronger than the usual weak continuity assumption. Under weak continuity, we would have for any sequence {(ω n D )} n in Φ(ω) with
(ω n D ) → (ω D ) ∈ Φ(ω), and any d Ω -closed F ∈ B(Ω), lim sup n q(F |ω, (ω n D )) ≤ q(F |ω, (ω D )) or equivalently,
, for any bounded, continuous function f (·). Under (A.3)(ii), however, we have strengthened weak continuity so that for any sequence
and any h-closed F ∈ B(Ω),
or equivalently (by Delbaen's Lemma (1974)),
, for any bounded, measurable function v(·).
Plans and Stationary Correlated Strategies
Plans
A plan π d = (π 1 d , π 2 d , . . .) for player d ∈ D is a sequence of history dependent conditional probability measures on (Ω, B(Ω) ). Under plan π d in period n given the history of states and action m−tuples (i.e., the (n−1)-sequence of network-coalition pairs and m-tuples of network-coalition proposals) H n−1 := ω 1 , ω 1 D , ω 2 , ω 2 D , . . . , ω n−1 , ω n−1 D , and given the current (period n) state ω n = (G n , S n ), player d chooses a networkcoalition proposal according to the conditional probability measure
Here, P (Φ d (ω n )) is the set of all probability measures with support contained in Φ d (ω n ). 8 Let H n−1 denote set of all (n − 1)-histories and let
Formally, the set of plans for player d is given by
. .) for player d ∈ D is a sequence of state-dependent conditional probability measures on (Ω, B(Ω)). Under Markov plan ψ d in period n given the current (period n) status quo network-coalition pair (or state) ω n = (G n , S n ), player d chooses a network proposal according to the conditional probability measure ψ n d (·|ω n ) ∈ P (Φ d (ω n )) .
Let Σ n d := Σ Φ d (Ω, P(Ω)) := Σ Φ d denote the set of all measurable functions, ω → ψ n d (·|ω) ∈ P(Ω) such that ψ n d (·|ω n ) ∈ P (Φ d (ω n )) for all ω n ∈ Ω. The set of Markov plans for player d is given by
A stationary Markov plan (σ d , σ d , . . .) for player d ∈ D -or as we shall call it here -a stationary strategy for player d ∈ D -is a constant sequence of statedependent conditional probability measures on (Ω, B(Ω)). Under stationary strategy (σ S , σ S , . . .) given the current (period n) status quo network-coalition pair (or state) ω n = (G n , S n ), player d, in each and every period n, chooses a network proposal according to the conditional probability measure
Rather than write σ d (·|ω) we will sometimes write σ d (ω).
Stationary Correlated Strategies
A stationary correlated strategy consists of m + 1 functions, λ i (·) : Ω → [0, 1] such that m i=0 λ i (ω) = 1 and m + 1 measurable functions σ i D (·) : Ω→ P(Ω) × · · · × P(Ω)
|D| times such that for each i = 0, 1, . . . , m and each state ω ∈ Ω, ·|·) ), if the current state is ω ∈ Ω then each player d chooses his network-coalition proposal (i.e., chooses his action) according to the probability measure σ i d (·|ω) ∈ P (Φ d (ω)). Under stationary correlated strategy (λ i (·), (σ i d (·|·))) m i=0 , if the current state is ω ∈ Ω then the i th m-tuple σ i D (·) of stationary strategies (one for each player) is chosen with probability λ i (ω) and each player d ∈ D follows stationary strategy
Thus, for each player d, σ λ d (·|·) is an element of Σ Φ d and under stationary strategy
, if the current state is ω ∈ Ω then player d will choose his network-coalition proposal according to probability measure
Note that if ω = (G, S) and d / ∈ S, then any measure
Thus, in any state ω = (G, S), if player d is not a member of the active coalition S, then his part of the correlated proposal strategy,
places probability 1 on the set of all proposals (G , S ) that include the status quo network G and zero probability on all others.
Player Payoffs
Given stationary correlated strategy (λ i (·), (σ i d (·|·))) m i=0 , if the current state is ω ∈ Ω then player d's immediate expected payoff is
If network-coalition proposal m-tuple ω D is chosen according to product measure σ λ D (·|ω), then nature chooses the next network-coalition pair (i.e., the next state) according to the law of motion (i.e., the probability measure) q(·|ω, ω D ).
Let
denote the n th period expected payoff to player d under stationary correlated strategy σ λ D (·) starting at network-coalition pair ω = (G, S) given law of motion q(·|·, ·). Here, for n ≥ 2, q n (·|ω, σ λ D (ω)) is defined recursively by
The discounted expected payoff to player d over an infinite time horizon under stationary correlated strategy σ λ D (·) ∈ d∈D Σ Φ d starting at state ω is then given by
In general, the discounted expected payoff to player d over an infinite time horizon under plan π D = (π d ) d∈D ∈ Π ∞ := d∈D Π ∞ d starting in state ω is then given by
Dynamic Network and Coalition Formation Games and Nash Equilibrium
A dynamic network and coalition formation game is given by
A dynamic network and coalition formation game starting at state ω ∈ Ω is given by
Definition 4 (Nash Equilibrium)
A stationary correlated strategy (λ * i (·), (σ * i d (·|·)) d∈D ) m i=0 with corresponding m-tuple of stationary strategies σ * λ D (·) = (σ * λ d (·|·)) d∈D is a Nash equilibrium of the dynamic network and coalition formation game Γ if for all starting networkcoalition pairs ω = (G, S) ∈ G×F and all players d ∈ D,
Thus, a stationary correlated strategy (λ * i (·), (σ * i d (·|·)) d∈D ) m i=0 with corresponding m-tuple of stationary strategies σ * λ D (·) is a Nash equilibrium of dynamic network and coalition formation game Γ if it is a Nash equilibrium for the game Γ ω for all starting states.
Theorem 1 (The Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Stationary Correlated Network and Coalition Formation Strategies)
Under assumptions [A-1]-[A-3] the dynamic network and coalition formation game
has a Nash equilibrium in stationary correlated strategies.
Our approach to proving existence essentially follows the approach introduced by Nowak and Raghavan in their seminal 1992 paper. 9 But because we assume that players' discount factors β d are heterogeneous, and more importantly, because our stochastic continuity assumptions concerning the law of motion are weaker than those of Nowak and Raghavan (their assumptions imply our assumptions), we include a proof in the last section of the paper. Our proof differs from that of Nowak and Raghavan in several respects, but as in Nowak and Raghavan, the basic objectives of our proof are to show that there exists a stationary correlated strategy (λ * i (·), (σ * i d (·|·)) d∈D ) m i=0 with corresponding m-tuple of stationary strategies (σ * λ d (·|·)) d∈D and an m-tuple of B(Ω)-measurable value functions, w * d (·) : Ω→[−M, M], such that for each player d ∈ D and for all states ω ∈ Ω,
and
Emergent Markov Process
Equilibrium Transitions
Under stationary correlated equilibrium, σ * λ D (·) = (σ * λ d (·|·)) d∈D , the emergent Markov process of network and coalition formation,
is governed by the equilibrium Markov transition, 10
Thus, Pr W * n+1 ∈ E|W * n = ω = p * (E|ω) and Pr {W * n ∈ E|W * 0 = ω} = p * n (E|ω) = q n (E|ω, σ * λ D (ω)), where the n-step transition p * n (·|·) is defined recursively as follows: for all ω ∈ Ω and E ∈ B(Ω),
for n = 1, 2, . . ., and p * 0 (·|ω) = δ ω (·) is the Dirac measure at ω. 
Absorbing Sets and Invariant and Ergodic Probability Measures
Thus, if probability measure λ(·) is p * -invariant, then for any set of network-coalition pairs E∈B(Ω), if the current status quo network-coalition pair ω n = (G n , S n ) is 10 Law of motion ω → p * (·|ω) is a Markov transition if for each ω, p * (·|ω) is a probability measure and for each E ∈ B(Ω), p * (E|·) :
is measurable. Here, ω = (G, S) is a realization of the process W * n = (G * n , S * n ) for some n.
chosen according to probability measure λ(·) -so that the probability that ω n lies in E is just λ(E) -then the probability that next period's network-coalition pair ω n+1 = (G n+1 , S n+1 ) lies in E is also λ(E) = Ω p * (E|ω)dλ(ω). Denote by I * the collection of all p * -invariant measure. A p * -invariant measure λ(·) is said to be p * -ergodic if λ(E) = 0 or λ(E) = 1 for all E∈L * . Denote by E * the collection of all p * -ergodic measures. Because the p * -ergodic probability measures are the extreme points of the (possibly empty) convex set I * of p * -invariant measures (see Theorem 19.25 in Aliprantis and Border (1999)), each measure λ(·) in I * can be written as a convex combination of the measures in E * .
Recurrence, Irreducibility, and Maximal Harris Sets
Given set E ∈ B(Ω), the number of visitations to E by the process {W * n } n = {(G * n , S * n )} ∞ n=1 is given by
while the expected number of visitations starting from network-coalition pair ω = (G, S) is given by
The hitting time of network-coalition formation process {W * n } n for set E∈B(Ω) is given by
Following in Tweedie (2001) ,
is the probability of hitting (or reaching) in finite time the set of network-coalition pairs E starting from network-coalition pair ω ∈ Ω given transition p * (·|·). Finally, the probability with which the network-coalition formation process {W * n } n visits E∈B(Ω) infinitely often (denoted by i.o.) is given by
By the Orey (1971) , if for any E ∈ B(Ω), L * (ω, E) = 1 for all ω ∈ Ω, then Q * (ω, E) = 1 for all ω ∈ Ω.
The network-coalition formation process {W * n } n governed by p * (·|·) is said to be ψ-irreducible if for some nontrivial, σ-finite measure ψ(·) on B(Ω),
Thus if the process {W * n } n governed by p * (·|·) is ψ-irreducible, then it hits all the "important" sets of network-coalition pairs (i.e., the sets E such that ψ(E) > 0) with positive probability starting from any network-coalition pair in the state space
The network-coalition formation process {W * n } n governed by p * (·|·) is said to be ψ-recurrent if for some nontrivial, σ-finite measure ψ(·) on B(Ω), A set of network-coalition pairs T ∈B(Ω) is transient if T is the disjoint union of countably many uniformly transient sets U j , that is, sets U j ∈B(Ω) such that T = ∪ j U j and for each set there is a finite constant M j , such that for all networkcoalition pairs ω ∈ U j ,
A set of network-coalition pairs E ∈ B(Ω) is said to be p * −inessential if Q * (ω, E) = 0 for all ω ∈ Ω.
Thus, a set of states E is inessential if the probability that the network-coalition formation process visits the set E infinitely often is zero stating from any state. If a set of states is inessential, then if the process visits the state at all, it leaves the state for good after finitely many moves. The union of countable many inessential states is called an improperly p * −essential set. Any other set is called properly p * −essential . We say that the Markov transition p * (·|·) satisfies global uniform countable additivity if for any sequence {B n } n ⊂ B(Ω) decreasing to ∅ (i.e., B n ↓ ∅),
The Fundamental Conditions for Stability: Drift and Global Uniform Countable Additivity
and we will say that the Tweedie conditions are satisfied globally if the Tweedie conditions hold with C = Ω. In Section 5 below, using some beautiful results by Meyn and Tweedie (1993) , Tweedie (2001) , and Costa and Dufour (2005) , we will show that if the emergent Markov transition p * (·|·) governing the equilibrium process of network and coalition formation is globally uniformly countable additive, then the equilibrium process possesses some striking stability properties -analogous to those demonstrated in for static abstract games of network formation.
To begin let us strengthen slightly our stochastic continuity assumption A-3(ii) as follows:
A-3 (ii)' for all d Ω -closed sets F ∈ B(Ω) of network-coalition pairs, the function
is continuous over the graph of Φ(·).
Theorem 2 (Setwise Convergence on Closed Sets and Global Uniform Countable Additivity)
Given that the state space (Ω, B(Ω)) of networks and coalitions is a compact metric space, if the law of motion is such that q(F |·, ·) is continuous on the graph of Φ(·) for all d Ω -closed sets F of network-coalition pairs (i.e., if A-3(ii)' is satisfied), then p * (·|·) is globally uniformly countable additive.
Proof. Let M (Ω) denote the Banach space of bounded measurable functions on (Ω, B(Ω)), equipped with the sup norm and let rca(Ω) denote the Banach space of finite signed Borel measures on (Ω, B(Ω) ). First, observe that the set of probability measures
is sequentially compact in the σ(rca(Ω), M(Ω)) topology. This follows because GrΦ(·) is a compact metric space and because by Delbaen's Lemma (1974) ,
By Corollary 2.2 in Lasserre (1998), therefore,
To see that (21) implies global uniform countable additivity (20) , consider a sequence {B k } k ⊂ B(Ω) decreasing to ∅ (i.e., B k ↓ ∅) and let v k (·) := I B k (·), where
We have
Finally, for each k let (ω k , ω k D ) ∈ GrΦ(·) be such that
We have for all ω ∈ G,
Remarks 2: Alternatively, global uniform countable additivity will be guaranteed if instead of assuming A-3(ii)', we add to our list of assumptions A-3 the following assumption:
A-3 (iv) the densities f (·|ω, ω D ) of q(·|ω, ω D ) with respect to the dominating probability measure μ are integrably bounded, that is, there exists a μ-integrable function
With this additional assumption, we have for any sequence {B n } n ⊂ B(Ω) decreasing to ∅ (i.e., B n ↓ ∅),
Let A-3 denote the altered or augmented set of assumptions A-3 (i.e., either altered by A-3 (ii)' or augmented by A-3 (iv)). By Theorem 2, under assumptions [A-1], [A-2], and [A-3'], the equilibrium Markov transition p * (·|·) governing the process of network and coalition formation is globally uniformly countably additive. Moreover, letting C = Ω, V (ω) = 1 for all ω ∈ Ω, and b = 2, the drift condition is also satisfied. Thus, by strengthening slightly the stochastic continuity properties of the law of motion q(·|·, ·) beyond what is required to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium Markov transition, p * (·|·), we are able to conclude in Theorem 2 that the Tweedie conditions are satisfied globally (i.e., with C = Ω).
Basins of Attraction, Invariance, and Ergodicity
We now have our first result concerning stochastic basins of attraction and the stability of the emergent network-coalition formation process
governed by p * (·|·). In particular, this decomposition is given by
where each H i is a maximal Harris set and T is transient. Moreover,
for every network-coalition pair ω ∈ Ω.
By Theorem 3, the emergent network-coalition formation process {W * n } n is such that starting at any network-coalition pair not contained in a basin of attraction, the process will reach some basin H i in a finite number of moves with probability 1, and once there will stay there with probability 1. An analogous conclusion is reached in for static, abstract games of network formation over finitely many networks. There it is shown that no matter what rules of network formation prevail, given any profile of player preferences the feasible set of networks contains a finite, disjoint collection of sets each set representing a strategic basin of attraction in the sense that if the game is repeated -each time starting at the status quo network reached in the previous play of the game -the process of network formation generated by repeating this static game will reach a network contained in some strategic basin and once there will stay there. 
for all ω ∈ Ω. 
be the emergent network-coalition formation process governed by the equilibrium Markov transition p * (·|·) = q(·|·, σ * λ D (·)), and let
be the corresponding finite Harris decomposition.
The following statements are true:
(1) Corresponding to each basin of attraction H i , there is a unique p * -invariant probability measure λ i (·) with λ i (H i ) = 1. Moreover, for each network-coalition pair ω = (G, S),
(25) where p * k (E|ω) is defined recursively, see (10) .
(2) The set of all ergodic probability measures is given by
Moreover, a probability measure λ(·) on (Ω, B(Ω)) is p * -invariant, i.e. λ(·) ∈ I * , if and only if λ(·) is given by The fact that (26) implies λ(·) ∈ I * follows from observation (but also, see Theorem 19.25 in Aliprantis and Border (1999) and Theorem 2 in Villareal (2004)).
(3) Finally, because the Tweedie Conditions are satisfied globally, necessary and sufficient conditions for E * to be a singleton, given in terms of ψ-irreducibility follow from Theorem 3 in Tweedie (2001) . The convergence result in part (3) follows from the convergence result in part (1) of the Theorem and the fact that if there is only one basin of attraction H (i.e., one maximal Harris set), then by Theorem 3, L * (ω, H) = 1 for all ω ∈ Ω.
Note that the probability measures in E * are orthogonal, that is, for all i and i in {1, 2, . . . , N} with i = i ,
Ergodic Properties of the Strategic Values
For each starting network-coalition pair ω = (G, S) ∈ Ω, w * d (ω) is the strategic value to player d of following his part of the stationary correlated equilibrium strategies σ * λ D (·), given that all other players follow their parts of the strategy. Because σ * λ D (·) 
governed by the equilibrium Markov transition p * (·|·) = q(·|·, σ * λ D (·)) is such that:
(1) for each player d starting at any network-coalition pair ω = (G, S) contained in a basin of attraction H i the time average value of the equilibrium strategies σ * λ D is equal to state average value of the equilibrium strategies, that is, for all basins of attraction H i and for all initial states ω = (G, S) ∈ H i ,
Moreover, for all initial states ω = (G, S) ∈ Ω,
(2) For all invariant measures λ(·) ∈ I *
where
Proof. (1) Part (1) is an immediate consequence of part (4) of Theorem 4, Delbaen's Lemma (1974) , and the fact that for all basins H i and all states ω ∈ H i , L * (ω, H i ) = 1.
(2) Let invariant probability measure λ(·) = N i=1 λ(H i )λ i (·) ∈ I * be given. We have
Moreover, because for all ω ∈ H i , L * (ω , H i ) = 1 and L * (ω , H i ) = 0, for all i = i,
and we will refer to the induced equilibrium Markov network-coalition transition, p * (·|·) = q(·|·, σ * λ D (·)), as the state transition. To begin, let L * λ d denote the set of absorbing sets corresponding to player d's Markov proposal transition σ * λ d (·|·). If E is an absorbing set for player d under σ * λ d (·|·), then for any status quo network-coalition pair ω = (G, S) ∈ E, it is optimal for player d ∈ S to propose with probability 1 either the status quo or a new networkcoalition pair ω in E (recall that if d / ∈ S, then the player is constrained to propose only that the status quo network be maintained). Thus, if E ∈ L * λ d , then for player d, σ * λ d (E|ω) = 1 for all status quo network-coalition pairs ω ∈ E. If in addition, E is an absorbing set for all players, that is, if E ∈ ∩ d∈D L * λ d , then for all status quo networkcoalition pair ω ∈ E, it is optimal for all players to propose a network-coalition pair contained in E with probability 1.
Unless E is of the form {G}×C for some feasible network G ∈ G and some feasible subcollection of coalitions C ⊆ F, players may not agree on their individual network proposals, but if E ∈ ∩ d∈D L * λ d then they will at least agree that their proposals should be drawn from E. Thus, we can think of the sets contained in ∩ d∈D L * λ d as being strategically stable. Now suppose that for some strategically stable set E, nature too chooses with probability 1 network-coalition pairs from E starting from any status quo network-coalition pair contained in E; that is, suppose that in addition to being strategically stable, E is absorbing for the state transition p * (·|·) = q(·|·, σ * λ D (·)). We can think of these sets as being dynamically consistent. Thus, a set of networkcoalition pairs E is dynamically consistent if E ∈ ∩ d∈D L * λ d ∩ L * , where as before L * is the collection of absorbing sets corresponding to the state transition p * (·|·).
We have the following formal definitions. The following result characterizes dynamic strategic stability and dynamic consistency. The proof is straightforward.
Theorem 6 (Dynamic Consistency and Invariance)
Suppose assumptions [A-1], [A-2] and [A-3'] hold and let
be the emergent network-coalition formation process governed by the equilibrium Markov transition p * (·|·) = q(·|·, σ * λ D (·)).
If E is dynamically consistent, then starting at any network-coalition pair contained in E, the network-coalition formation process will reach in finite time with probability 1 a nonempty subset of network-coalition pairs E ∩ H i , where H i is a basin of attraction and once there will remain there. Moreover, there exists a p * -invariant probability measure which assigns positive measure to E ∩ H i .
It is important to note that while E ∩ H i is absorbing for the state transition p * (·|·); that is, while E ∩H i ∈ L * , E ∩H i is not necessarily absorbing for each player's proposal transition σ * λ d (·|·); that is, it is not necessarily true that E ∩ H i ∈ ∩ d∈D L * λ d . Letting E be any dynamically consistent set, note that it is possible for E to intersect more than one basin of attraction. It is also possible for E to intersect the transient set -but it is not possible for E to be a subset of the transient set. Let us suppose then that the dynamically consistent set E intersects basins H i and H i , and consider any p * -invariant measure λ(·) such that λ(E) = 1. By part (2) of Theorem 4 above we have,
Thus, under any p * -invariant measure λ(·) the measure of any absorbing set E is a weighted sum of the probability masses the invariant measures λ(·) assigns to each basin H i .
Dynamic Path dominance Core and Dynamic Pairwise Stability
One way to extend the definition of the path dominance core introduced in Page and Wooders (2007) to the dynamic setting considered here is as follows:
Definition 6 (The Dynamic Path Dominance Core)
A network G * ∈ G is in the dynamic path dominance core if the set of states {G * } × C ∈ B(Ω) is dynamically consistent for some subset of coalitions C ⊆ F.
We have the following characterization. 
If network G * ∈ G is in the dynamic path dominance core, that is, if {G * } × C is dynamically consistent for some subset of coalitions C ⊆ F, then starting at any network-coalition pair contained in {G * } × C, the network-coalition formation process will reach in finite time with probability 1 a nonempty subset of networkcoalition pairs ({G * } × C)∩H i , where H i is a basin of attraction and once there will remain there. Moreover, there exists a p * -invariant probability measure which assigns positive measure to ({G * } × C) ∩ H i .
Note that if for some network G * ∈ G and some coalition S * ∈ F, {G * } × {S * } is dynamically consistent, then G * is in the path dominance core and {G * } × {S * } is a subset of some basin of attraction. However, if there exists a basin of attraction H i * of the form
it is not necessarily dynamically consistent -and therefore, G * may not be in the dynamic path dominance core. Why? Because while nature will choose with probability 1 the network-coalition pair (G * , S * ) if the status quo is (G * , S * ), some players may not do so (i.e., it may be the case that {G * } × {S * } / ∈ L * λ d for some player d). This leads to the following alternative definition of the dynamic path dominance core. Under this definition, for any basin of attraction H i * of the form H i * = {G * } × {S * }, G * is in the weak dynamic path dominance core. Moreover, if for some dynamically consistent set E, E ∩ H i * is nonempty but E is disjoint from the other basins, then starting at any network-coalition pair in E, the process will reach in finite time with probability 1 the network-coalition pair (G * , S * ) and will remain there.
Finally, note that if p * ({G * } × C|G * , S) = 1 for all S ∈ C ⊆ F, then because the law of motion q(·|(G, S), (G D S D ))
is absolutely continuous with respect the probability measure μ = ν × γ for all ((G, S), (G D , S D )) ∈ GrΦ(·), G * must be an atom of the probability measure ν, that is,
Moreover, no network G ∈ G\A ν , can be in the dynamic path dominance core.
To extend the definition of the pairwise stability introduced in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) to the dynamic setting considered here, we begin by specializing the feasible set of coalitions to coalitions of size no greater than 2.
Definition 7 (Dynamic Pairwise Stability)
Suppose the feasible set of coalitions is given by
(i.e., all feasible coalitions consist of at most two players). Then a network G * ∈ G is dynamically pathwise stable if the set of states {G * } × C 2 ∈ B(Ω) is dynamically consistent for some subset of coalitions C 2 ⊆ F 2 .
We have the following characterization be the emergent network-coalition formation process governed by the equilibrium Markov transition p * (·|·) = q(·|·, σ * λ D (·)).
If network G * ∈ G is dynamically pairwise stable, that is, if {G * }×C 2 is dynamically consistent for some subset of coalitions C 2 ⊆ F 2 , then starting at any networkcoalition pair contained in {G * } × C 2 , the network-coalition formation process will reach in finite time with probability 1 a nonempty subset of network-coalition pairs ({G * } × C 2 ) ∩ H i , where H i is a basin of attraction and once there will remain there. Moreover, there exists a p * -invariant probability measure which assigns positive measure to ({G * } × C 2 ) ∩ H i .
Our conclusion that for some basin of attraction H i , ({G * } × C 2 )∩H i is contained in the support of some p * -invariant measure is similar to the conclusion reached by Jackson and Watts (2002) for a stochastic process of network formation over a finite set of linking networks governed by Markov chain generated by myopic players. They reach their conclusion by considering a sequence of perturbed irreducible and aperiodic Markov chains (i.e., each with a unique invariant measure) converging to the original Markov chain. This method is similar to a method introduced into games by Young (1993) which in turn is based on some very general perturbation methods found in Freidlin and Wentzell (1984) . Here we have reached a similar conclusions without using perturbation methods. The proof will proceed in 5 steps:
Step 1 : Let is continuous for any v d (·) ∈ V. Thus, for ω ∈ Ω and v d (·) ∈ V σ → u d (ω, σ)(v d ) and σ → V (ω, σ)(v) are continuous on Π d∈D P (Φ d (ω)) with respect to the compact and metrizable topology of weak convergence of probability measures. Thus, for all ω ∈ Ω and v(·) ∈ V m , N v (ω) is a nonempty, compact subset of Π d∈D P (Φ d (ω)) and by Theorem 6.4 in Himmelberg (1975) N v (·) is measurable. q(Ω|ω, (ω d ))dσ * ((ω d )|ω)), so that A n → 0.
Next, given that the probability measures q(·|ω, (ω d )) are absolutely continuous with respect to probability measure μ, v n (·) → v * (·) weakly implies that for each
.
In particular, we have for each (ω, (ω d ))
F n (ω, (ω d )) := Ω v n d (ω )dq(ω |ω, (ω d )) = Ω v n d (ω )f (ω |ω, (ω d ))dμ(ω)
→ Ω v * d (ω )f (ω |ω, (ω d ))dμ(ω) = Ω v * d (ω )dq(ω |ω, (ω d )) := F * (ω, (ω d )), where f (ω |ω, (ω d )) is the density of q(ω |ω, (ω d )) with respect to μ. Thus, by the Dominated Convergence Theorem β d Φ(ω) F n (ω, (ω d ))dσ * ((ω d )|ω) → β d Φ(ω) F * (ω, (ω d ))dσ * ((ω d )|ω)), so that B n → 0.
Therefore, we conclude that if v n (·) → v * (·) and σ n (ω) → σ * (ω), then for all players d ∈ D, u d (ω, σ n (ω))(v n d ) → u d (ω, σ * (ω))(v * d ). Second, we have U n (·) → U * (·) weakly where for all n, U n (·) ∈ Σ(coP v n (·)), and v n (·) → v * (·) weakly where for all n, v n (·) ∈ V m . By Proposition 1 in Page (1991), we can assume without loss of generality that for some μ null set N (i.e., μ(N ) = 0) 1 n n k=1 U k (ω) → U (ω) and U (ω) ∈ coLs {U n (ω)} for all ω ∈ Ω\N .
